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Abstract 
Objective:  Environmental dependency syndrome (EDS), including utilisation (UB) 
and imitation (IB) behaviours, is often reported in behavioural variant frontotemporal 
dementia (bvFTD). These behaviours are commonly attributed to executive 
dysfunction. However, inconsistent associations between EDS and poor executive 
performance has led to an alternative “social hypothesis”, instead implicating 
patients’ misinterpretation of the examiner’s intention. We investigated the possible 
explanatory cognitive mechanisms of EDS in bvFTD by relating UB and IB to 
performance on tests of executive functioning and theory of mind (ToM). Method: 
This study analysed retrospective data of 32 bvFTD patients. Data included scores of 
UB and IB, various executive measures, and ToM assessment using the faux pas test, 
from which we extracted a mental attribution score.  Results: Of the patients, 15.6% 
and 40.6% exhibited UB and IB, respectively. We conducted an automatic linear 
modelling analysis with executive and mental attribution measures as predictor 
variables and UB and IB sequentially considered as target variables. ToM mental 
attribution score, visual abstraction and flexibility measures from Wisconsin Card 
Sorting Test and motor sequence performance significantly (corrected p’s<.05) 
predicted IB. No executive or ToM measures significantly predicted UB. 
Conclusions: These findings reveal a complex interaction between executive 
dysfunction and mental attribution deficits influencing the prevalence of EDS in 
bvFTD. Further investigation is required to improve our understanding of the 
mechanisms underlying these behaviours.  
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Public significance: Environmental-dependency syndrome (EDS) is a group 
of pathological behaviours that have been reported after frontal lesion/degeneration. 
Typically, patients use objects without having been asked to do so or imitate an 
examiner’s gestures during a clinical examination. The reasons for the presence of 
such behaviours are poorly understood and this study aimed to understand their 
cognitive origin, and whether EDS could be attributed to disinhibition or to a failure 
to infer the examiner’s expectations. 
Introduction 
Utilisation (UB) and imitation behaviours (IB) are the most commonly 
reported signs of an environmental dependency syndrome (EDS), such that they are 
complex motor sequences elicited by external stimuli (Lhermitte, 1983). In more 
detail, UB is defined as the tendency for patients to seize and use familiar objects in 
an irrelevant context, while IB refers to when patients mimic gestures performed by 
the examiner (Lhermitte, Pillon, & Serdaru, 1986). Both UB and IB occur without 
instruction and often persist or reoccur after the examiner gives direct instruction to 
stop. These behaviours were first observed in patients with frontal lesions (Lhermitte, 
1983) and as such are considered characteristic of frontal or fronto-striatal 
dysfunction, which was later confirmed (De Renzi, Cavalleri, & Facchini, 1996; 
Eslinger, Warner, Grattan, & Easton, 1991; Fukui, Hasegawa, Sugita, & Tsukagoshi, 
1993; Shallice, Burgess, Schon, & Baxter, 1989). UB and IB have since been reported 
in neurodegenerative conditions such as frontotemporal dementia (FTD) (Ghosh & 
Dutt, 2010), particularly its behavioural variant (bvFTD) (Ghosh, Dutt, Bhargava, & 
Snowden, 2013; Grossi, De Lucia, Milan, & Trojano, 2015) which is characterized by 
a marked brain atrophy involving frontal regions and fronto-striatal networks 
(Bertoux, O'Callaghan, Flanagan, Hodges, & Hornberger, 2015). 
Resulting from the association between EDS and compromised frontal lobe 
functioning, the Supervisory Attentional System model proposed by Norman and 
Shallice (Norman & Shallice, 1980) emerged as the dominant explanatory hypothesis 
for EDS. According to this model, EDS results from the ineffective inhibition by 
higher-level executive process of the activation and enactment of learned motor 
sequences that are elicited by environmental stimuli, such as a familiar object or a 
gesture (Blakemore, Wolpert, & Frith, 2002; Frith, Blakemore & Wolpert, 2000). As 
such, UB and IB are expected to arise in the context of executive impairment with 
relatively preserved visuospatial functioning. However, this model was mainly based 
on the exploration of EDS in patients with focal frontal lesions and the specific link 
between UB and IB and a dysexecutive syndrome has been sparsely investigated so 
far. The neuropsychological underpinnings of EDS, specifically executive function, 
have only been investigated recently. In particular, a study by Besnard and colleagues 
(Besnard et al., 2011) demonstrated that UB and IB poorly correlated with executive 
dysfunction, therefore calling into question the applicability of the Supervisory 
Attentional System model to EDS. These findings were supported by those from a 
recent study investigating UB and IB in bvFTD, which found that executive measures 
only correlated weakly with EDS behaviours (Ghosh et al., 2013). Studies conducted 
on frontal lesion patients also yielded contradictory results although IB and UB were 
only observed in a negligible percentage of their samples, therefore complicating the 
interpretation of these findings (Brazzelli, Colombo, Della Sala, & Spinnler, 1994; De 
Renzi et al., 1996). In this context, Besnard and colleagues argued that although the 
Supervisory Attentional System model might provide an appropriate framework to 
explain the activation of a well-learned motor sequence, such as with UB, it did not 
adequately explain other environmentally dependent behaviours that may not have 
been previously learned, as could be the case for IB (Besnard et al., 2011). As a result, 
they proposed an alternative ‘social hypothesis’ that EDS symptoms could instead be 
underpinned by the patient’s misinterpretation of the examiner’s intentions, possibly 
mediated by theory of mind (ToM) deficits. According to this hypothesis, patients 
misinterpret that the presentation of an object or gesture by the examiner as an 
indication that the examiner requires a response. Following this, two studies involving 
small groups of frontal lesion cases were conducted (Besnard et al., 2016a; Besnard J. 
et al., 2016b). In both studies, no correlation was found between EDS and executive 
performance as well as ToM measures. This absence of association between EDS and 
ToM was attributed to the nature of the ToM task employed, which relied on the 
attribution of intentions without involving any social interaction and evaluation of 
social knowledge. This social contextual element could be indeed crucially relevant to 
the social hypothesis of EDS, which posits that these behaviours arise from poor 
mental attribution within the context of social interaction between patient and 
examiner. 
By contrast, in this study, we aim to investigate the relationship between EDS 
and executive/attentional impairment as well as mental attribution ability on a test of 
social faux pas in a group of patients with behavioural variant of frontotemporal 
dementia (bvFTD). The behavioural variant of frontotemporal dementia (bvFTD) 
provides an ideal population to evaluate these two hypotheses due to these patients’ 
characteristic marked executive (Rascovsky et al., 2011) and social cognition deficits 
(Bertoux, et al., 2016a; Elamin, Pender, Hardiman, & Abrahams, 2012), including 
pronounced ToM impairment (Bertoux et al., 2012; Torralva et al., 2007). No study to 
our knowledge has directly investigated and contrasted the Supervisory Attentional 
System model and the social hypothesis in the same sample by applying a measure of 
mental attribution dependent on social interaction knowledge. We aimed to address 
this by relating the occurrence of the most common symptoms of EDS, namely UB 
and IB, to performance on a range of tests assessing executive functioning and ToM, 
including a novel mental attribution score. Additionally, instead of using a classical 
statistical approach such as correlations or analyses of variances, we used an 
automated linear model to more accurately determine the respective contributions of 
these cognitive processes to the prevalence of these abnormal behaviours. 
 
Methods 
Participants 
We selected 32 bvFTD patients from the database of the Memory and Language Unit, 
Saint-Anne Hospital (Paris, France) between September 2013 and January 2016. 
Patients were selected if they received a clinical diagnosis of bvFTD and had 
complete demographic and neuropsychological data relevant to this study completed 
during the same clinical visit. The diagnosis was made after a multi-disciplinary 
consultation with a team involving neurological and neuropsychological assessments. 
All patients (1) presented with prominent changes in personality and social behaviour 
according to the core clinical diagnostic criteria for probable bvFTD (Rascovsky et 
al., 2011); (2) were followed-up over at least 24 months to ensure that the clinical 
progression was consistent with the diagnosis of bvFTD (to exclude non-progressive 
phenocopy cases (Kipps, Hodges, & Hornberger, 2010)); (3) underwent magnetic 
resonance imaging (MRI) and/or single photon emission computed tomography 
(SPECT), showing respectively a frontal/fronto-temporal atrophy or hypoperfusion. 
We included patients with memory impairment if the patient met the other core 
diagnostic criteria for probable bvFTD (Bertoux et al., 2014). Finally, a lumbar 
puncture was administered to 11 of the patients, mostly in amnestic cases where the 
distinction between bvFTD and AD was unclear, showing for all of them a non-
Alzheimer cerebro-spinal fluid (CSF) biomarkers profile, therefore excluding the 
possibility of atypical frontal Alzheimer’s disease. Exclusion criteria for this study 
were (1) clinical or neuroimaging evidence of focal lesions, (2) severe cortical or 
subcortical vascular lesions on brain MRI, (3) severe depression or other psychiatric 
condition such as bipolar disorder or schizophrenia, or (4) motor neuron disease. 
Biological and clinical data of all patients were generated during routine clinical 
workup and were retrospectively extracted for the purpose of this study. As per 
French legislation, explicit informed consent was waived as patients and their 
relatives were informed that individual data might be used in retrospective clinical 
research studies. 
 
Neuropsychological assessment 
Each patient underwent a comprehensive neuropsychological examination. 
Overall cognitive performance was measured using the Mini Mental State Examination 
(MMSE; maximum score 30) (Folstein, 2001) and the Mattis Dementia Rating Scale 
(MDRS; maximum score 144) (Mattis, 1976) assessing general efficiency. Executive 
and working memory/attention measures included semantic and lexical verbal fluency 
tests, forward and backward digit spans as well as the Frontal Assessment Battery 
(FAB; maximum score 18) (Dubois, Slachevsky, Litvan, & Pillon, 2000) and the 
modified Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST) (Nelson, 1976). Notably, we included 
in the analyses the four following FAB subscores: similarities, Luria’s motor 
sequences, conflicting instructions and go/no-go, and the three following WCST 
scores: number of categories identified and successfully maintained, number of 
perseverative errors, number of attentional errors. 
ToM was assessed using the reduced and modified faux pas test (maximum 
score 15) from the mini Social cognition and Emotional Assessment (mini-SEA) 
(Bertoux et al., 2012). Briefly, patients have to read short stories and to detect the 
presence of a faux pas. After its correct detection, they have to answer questions 
assessing its identification, knowledge, intentionality, and emotional impact on the 
victim (empathy). As a novelty, we defined a mental attribution score by adding the 
scores assessing Intentionality and Empathy (maximum score 2). 
 
Evaluation of ED 
UB and IB were evaluated using standardized procedures extensively described 
in a previous work (Lagarde et al., 2013). The method we used was closer to the 
‘incidental’ method of measuring UB, following the distinction between ‘induced’ and 
‘incidental’ UB proposed by Shallice et al. (Shallice et al., 1989). To summarize, UB 
was assessed throughout the examination when the patient was engaged in other tasks 
(for example, during a clinical interview). Objects (such as a pencil, a piece of paper, a 
mobile phone, etc.) were, one at a time, successively put on the desk within the patient’s 
reach without any comment or instructions from the clinician. UB occurred if the 
patient used an object after being instructed not to do so. To assess IB, the clinician, 
again without providing instructions, performed different gestures as previously 
described by Lhermitte et al. (Lhermitte et al., 1986a): clapping hands, slapping his/her 
thighs with both hands at the same time and executing a military salute. If the patient 
imitated the gestures spontaneously, the clinician told him/her not to do so, and then 
repeated the gestures one more time.  
The presence of each of the two behaviours (UB, IB) was initially rated by 
clinicians according to the original rating scale outlined by Lhermitte and colleagues 
(Lhermitte et al., 1986a) ranging from 0 to 4. The two higher scores indicated the 
absence of IB with either the patient questioning the clinician in order to know if he/she 
has to imitate (score of 3) or no hesitation and no behaviour at all (score of 4).  We 
chose to transpose Lhermitte et al.’s original scale into a 0 to 3 rating scale, but contrary 
to previous studies, our scoring collapses these last two scores (which should be 
considered as normal scores as they reflect normal behaviour) and retains the lower 
scores. Scoring of IB and UB was therefore: 3/3 for no abnormal behaviour 2/3 when 
patients performed the abnormal behaviour but stopped when the clinician asked them 
not to do so; 1/3 when patients performed the abnormal behaviour, stopped when the 
clinician asked but continued to imitate/utilize after a short interfering period; 0/3 when 
patients performed the abnormal behaviour and did not stop it even after the clinician 
asked them to stop.  
 
Statistical analyses 
All analyses were performed using IBM SPSS Statistics, Version 23.0. The 
automatic linear modelling (LINEAR) procedure was used to identify the 
neuropsychological predictors of each EDS behaviour. This procedure overcomes 
several limitations of a standard linear regression procedure by implementing an 
automatic data preparation and subset selection method. In particular, it can compute 
all-possible-subsets regression of potential predictors rather than only stepwise 
regression, which allows for the best subset of variables to be determined and 
therefore a more precise detection of relevant predictors. For all significant predictors, 
the predictor importance indicates the relative importance of each predictor in 
estimating the model. In SPSS, the residual sum of squares is employed to compute 
this value, generated from the squared semi-partial correlations. The sum of these 
relative values should be equal to 1. Sequential Holm-Bonferroni corrections for 
multiple comparisons were applied to the resulting model. Non-parametric spearman 
rank correlation was used to relate UB to IB and mental attribution to executive 
functioning (EF) measures due to the non-normal distributions of these variables, with 
Bonferroni corrections.  
 
Results 
Demographics and clinical data 
Patients had a mean age of 63 year (SD = 8.84), education of 10.93 years (SD 
= 3.62), and 21 of the patients were male.  The mean disease duration since first 
symptoms was 3.18 years (SD = 2.55). Both MMSE (M = 24.27, SD = 3.69) and 
MDRS (M = 124.46, SD = 12.85) scores indicated that patients were in early and mild 
stages of the disease. 
 
Prevalence of environmental dependency behaviours in bvFTD 
Of the patients, 15.6% (n=5) exhibited UB, defined by a score <3/3. 
Specifically, 12.5% (n=4) exhibited UB but stopped when instructed to (score=2/3), 
and 3.1% (n=1) exhibited this behaviour, stopped when asked to, and then exhibited it 
after a short interfering period (score=1/3).  
For IB, 40.6% (n=13) of the patients exhibited the behaviour, defined by a 
score <3/3. In more detail, 15.6% (n=5) imitated but did stop when asked not to 
continue the behaviour (score=2/3), and 25% (n=8) of patients imitated and continued 
to do so after a short interfering period (score=1/3).  
In the whole sample, 9.4% of the patients (n=3) exhibited both IB and UB, and 
46.9% (n=15) showed at least one ED behaviour. A spearman rank correlation analysis 
conducted between both behavioural scores (IB and UB) was non-significant (r=.09 
and p=.61).  
 
Relationship between EF measures and mental attribution score 
There were no significant correlations between mental attribution and EF 
measures (p’s > .05). 
 
Cognitive predictors of ED symptoms in bvFTD 
The automatic linear modelling analysis failed to identify any cognitive 
variables that significantly predicted UB. As only 15.6% of bvFTD patients (n=5) 
exhibited UB, the variance of this score may not have been sufficient to detect 
significant predictors in this small sample size. 
The automatic linear modelling analysis for IB showed that it was significantly 
predicted (R2=.64) by the WCST category score, perseveration errors and attentional 
errors, as well as the Mini-SEA mental attribution score, and the FAB Luria motor 
sequence score. Results are presented in Table 1. After applying a Holm-Bonferroni 
correction, the attentional errors of the WSCT lost significance as a predictor but the 
mental attribution score, WCST perseveration errors, category score and FAB Luria 
motor sequence score remained significantly significant predictors of IB. 
Interestingly, the WCST category score had the highest importance value 
(0.410), suggesting that it is the most important predictor of the model. 
 
 
(Please insert Table 1 around here) 
 
 
Discussion 
This study aimed to investigate and compare the two predominant theories 
explaining EDS, namely the Supervisory Attentional System and social hypothesis 
models. Using an original statistical approach based on automated linear modelling in 
a well-characterized group of bvFTD patients, with frontal involvement causing both 
executive and social cognition deficits, our results indicate that impairments of both 
executive functioning and ToM appear to contribute to EDS, and more specifically 
IB, suggesting a more complex interaction between cognitive mechanisms than 
previously suggested.  
When considering all cognitive variables included in the automated linear 
model, this study showed that processes dependent on executive functioning including 
visual abstraction impairment, cognitive inhibition deficit, decreased attention and 
motor sequence dysfunctions were all identified as significant predictors of IB. 
However, the results also showed that impaired mental attribution abilities could also 
relate to this behaviour, as it significantly predicted its presence. Taken altogether, our 
findings show for the first time that both executive and mental attribution 
dysfunctions could explain IB, suggesting a complex picture of mechanisms relating 
to this abnormal behaviour. These findings have significant theoretical consequence 
and, although they are preliminary, lend support to both the classic hypothesis that 
EDS behaviours stem from ineffective executive control over externally-stimulated 
activity (S.-J. Blakemore, D. M. Wolpert, & C. D. Frith, 2002; C. D. Frith, S. 
Blakemore, & D. M. Wolpert, 2000) as well as the recently proposed ‘social 
hypothesis’ (Besnard et al., 2011), which considers that EDS arises from a 
misinterpretation of the examiner’s intentions.  
It is of interest to consider that, in his seminal observations, Lhermitte noted 
that EDS behaviours can often reflect a dependency towards a social context, and 
posited therefore that the true dimension of IB and UB is social (Lhermitte, 1986b). 
This present study is the first to provide empirical results that could support the social 
hypothesis of EDS, or, in another words, that EDS could arise from a failed 
attribution of the examiner’s intentions within the social context of the clinical 
examination. The two studies having previously directly assessed the social 
interpretation of EDS have indeed failed to provide any results in its favour (Besnard 
et al, 2016a; 2016b). In the first study, only 4 patients of the case series exhibited 
EDS, of which only one showed a ToM deficit, which was insufficient to establish 
any statistical association. In the second study, the important overlap between patients 
and controls in the ToM tasks revealed that only a handful of frontal patients actually 
exhibited a ToM impairment, which should have drastically limited the investigation 
of its link with EDS. Another explanation of such diverging results with our study is 
the nature of the ToM tasks that were used in Besnard and colleagues’ studies. 
Indeed, the Character Intention Task (Brunet, Sarfati, Hardy-Baylé & Decety, 2000) 
and the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test (Baron-Cohen, Jolliffe, Mortimore & 
Robertson, 1997) do not involve any context of social interaction or social knowledge 
assessment by contrast to the measure we used to assess mental attribution. In more 
detail, the Character Intention Task involves the choice, among three proposed 
drawings, of the one that complete a story depicted by three previous cartoons. In this 
story, a character’s behaviour is initiated (e.g. sawing prisons bars) and has to be 
continued by choosing a last drawing either depicting an action that would be 
compatible with the character’s initial intention (e.g. making a rope out of clothes) or 
not compatible (e.g. sleeping or yelling). The Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test 
requires the subject to choose, among four verbal labels, the correct label 
corresponding to the affective state of images showing the eye region of the face. 
Neither the first nor the second task involve any social context or social interaction, 
by contrast to the faux pas test where short stories depict interactions between several 
characters, and the inference of intention is required in order to detect and understand 
the faux pas. Although we acknowledge that, in this last test, patients do not actively 
participate in these interactions, but rather are spectators, we believe that our measure 
of mental attribution is more appropriate to test the social hypothesis in the EDS field, 
as it is a direct measure of mental attribution in a context of social interaction, by 
contrast to measures previously used. Further studies should directly and explicitly 
investigate mental attribution during EDS evaluation. 
Among all the cognitive variables that were entered into the automated linear 
model, those tapping into abstract reasoning, cognitive inhibition, attentional and 
motor sequencing abilities as well as mental attribution capacity were the significant 
predictors of IB. Visual abstract reasoning difficulties, as assessed by the WCST, 
could relate to poor deductive reasoning by the patient of what should be done or not 
during the incidental assessment of IB. The relationship between IB and cognitive 
disinhibition, as reflected by WCST perseverative errors, could lend partial support to 
the Supervisory Attentional System model of EDS arising from an inability to 
regulate behaviour elicited by external stimuli, particularly after that stimulus is no 
longer contextually relevant. In addition, it should be noted that the data of our study 
were extracted from a clinical neuropsychological assessment in which the patients 
have been previously reinforced to imitate some of the clinician’s gestures or to repeat 
words, through the evaluation of praxis and language. Although we lack data to 
support this assumption, it could be hypothesised that, stuck within a positively 
reinforced behaviour of imitation, favoured by some attentional disturbances 
(although this variable failed to reach significance after correction for multiple 
comparisons) and impairment of mental attribution abilities, the patients could have 
been more prone to imitate the examiner’s actions in an ambiguous setting. As an 
extension to this hypothesis, one could assume that the rigid and directive framework 
of the neuropsychological or neurological evaluation, taking place into the 
intimidating context of a hospital clinic and encouraged by the clinician’s dominant 
status (Freidson, 1970), could increase the likelihood of IB. A last result of particular 
note is the relationship between IB and difficulties to complete Luria’s motor 
sequence, which in addition to being considered predominantly indicative of frontal 
impairment, is also partly dependent on patients’ ability to imitate clinicians. 
However, imitation is not the ability assessed by this task as its scores instead reflect 
the ability to reproduce three gestures in the correct order and to maintain this pattern 
after the examiner has stopped presenting the sequence. We therefore believe that this 
observed statistical relationship could indicate more of a frontal contribution of the 
areas that match the voluntary motor programming of actions rather than being linked 
to imitation abilities. 
An interesting point of discussion regarding the contribution of both executive 
and ToM performances to predict the prevalence of EDS is the specific link between 
these two former cognitive processes. Several authors consider indeed that ToM relies 
on executive functioning and could therefore be critically impaired due to executive 
dysfunction (Devine & Hughes, 2014). From this perspective, the mental attribution 
deficit predicting IB in our study could have been interpreted as an indirect 
consequence of a primary executive deficit. In other words, following this view, one 
could hypothesise that executive deficit would be the sole predictor of both IB and 
mental attribution impairment at the same time. Indeed, although previous group 
findings (Bertoux, O'Callaghan, Dubois, & Hornberger, 2016) and clinical cases 
(Lough, Gregory, & Hodges, 2001) tend to support a relative independence between 
ToM and executive functioning performances in bvFTD, recent evidence suggests 
that mental attribution mechanisms, and not other ToM dimensions, could specifically 
rely on executive functions (Bertoux et al., 2016b; Le Bouc et al., 2012; Snowden et 
al., 2003). This link echoes the common view that one has to inhibit his or her own 
mental states in order to infer the mental state of others (Samson, Apperly, 
Kathirgamanathan, & Humphreys, 2005), which is supported by the interacting 
models of ToM processing (Samson, 2009; Stone & Gerrans, 2006). However, in the 
sole framework of our study, it appeared unlikely that executive deficits, and 
particularly cognitive disinhibition, have negatively impacted mental attribution 
abilities in bvFTD patients, thus leading to an IB, as no correlation was observed 
between mental attribution performances and any scores of executive functioning. 
This result is moreover in agreement with recent findings suggesting that the 
inhibitory mechanisms necessary to infer another’s mental state could be specific to 
mental state attribution processes and independent from other executive processes 
(Samson, Houthuys, & Humphreys, 2015).  
A large proportion of patients (40.6%) exhibited IB, which is in line with the 
previous active investigations of IB prevalence in bvFTD, ranging from 32% to 61% 
(Ghosh et al., 2013; Grossi et al., 2015; Lagarde et al., 2013; Shimomura & Mori, 
1998). However, only ≈16% of patients exhibited UB, a lower proportion than in 
several previous investigations where the prevalence of incidental UB in FTD ranged 
from 58% to 70% (Ghosh & Dutt, 2010; Ghosh et al., 2013; Grossi et al., 2015). One 
possible reason for this discrepancy is that the patients included in our study were in 
the very mild stages of disease, whereas in the studies by Ghosh and colleagues 
(2010; 2013), patients were at more severe stages, as indicated by much lower scores 
on screening tests and disease severity. Indeed, there appears to be a link in these 
studies between more advanced or fast-progressing bvFTD and the emergence of 
more prevalent UB. Furthermore, previous studies have shown that UB is less 
commonly detected under active investigation than IB in mild bvFTD, with UB being 
quite rare at this early disease stage compared to IB (Lagarde et al., 2013). It has 
further been demonstrated in bvFTD that while IB is better detected than UB via 
active assessment in the clinic (Ghosh et al., 2013; Shimomura & Mori, 1998), UB is 
more commonly reported via other methods such as caregiver history (Ghosh & Dutt, 
2010; Ghosh et al., 2013).  
Regarding the prevalence of both behaviours in our study, another point of 
interest is that only a small percentage (9.4%) of the patients exhibited both IB and 
UB in this study. Furthermore, IB and UB scores were not correlated with each other. 
Previous works have discussed the difference in prevalence of UB and IB within the 
same sample (De Renzi et al., 1969; Lagarde et al., 2013) and found the same pattern, 
with UB being rarely observed. We believe that this difference of prevalence or 
variance between the scores suggests that the two behaviours may relate to deficits in 
different processes. In line with this discrepancy between IB and UB, previous 
evidence has suggested that IB could be more dependent on processes underlying 
social control and self/other distinction by contrast to UB (Brass, Derrfuss, & von 
Cramon, 2005; Brass, Ruby, & Spengler, 2009; Spengler, von Cramon, & Brass, 
2009). Taken together, these findings question the coherence of EDS as a clinical 
syndrome and suggest that IB and UB are in fact different phenomena, in line with 
previous works suggesting that these behaviours rely on distinct neural mechanisms 
(Rizzolatti, Fabbri-Destro, & Cattaneo, 2009). 
Among the limitations of this study, we believe that despite the good sample 
size in this study, a larger sample size could have allowed a better detection of the 
mechanisms relating to EDS - especially UB, due to its rarity in this sample. Indeed, 
any assertions regarding EDS and its relationship to impairment in executive and 
ToM processes in our study can only be based on the findings for IB, as no significant 
predictors were found for UB. This is likely due to the small proportion of patients 
exhibiting this behaviour, which provided insufficient variance to detect significant 
predictors. Future studies with larger sample size could therefore yield enough 
variance to detect predictors of this behaviour. In particular, future studies should 
focus on context processing, which is known to be impaired in frontal patients 
(O’Callaghan et al., 2016), as context seems to be a critical dimension of EDS’ 
expression. In addition, a question remains to determine whether abnormal behaviours 
such as IB or UB truly reveal, as Lhermitte suggested (1986), a more general 
dependency towards the environment in daily activities. Although examples related 
by bvFTD patients’ carers during clinical interviews tend to support this idea, as well 
as patient’s carer interviews (Gosh et al., 2013), the validity of EDS outside the clinic 
should be assessed in a more systematic way in future studies to highlight the clinical 
interest of screening for such abnormal behaviour. 
In conclusion, novel findings from this study provide support for a complex 
interaction of mechanisms relating to some EDS symptoms in bvFTD, with results 
suggesting a critical implication of both executive and social cognitive processes. As 
such, these preliminary results tend to support both the “social hypothesis” (Besnard 
et al., 2011) and the classical Supervisory Attentional System model positing that 
EDS is driven by compromised executive function (Norman & Shallice, 1980).  
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 M (SD) B 
coefficient 
Std. 
Error 
t Sig. 95% CI Importance 
WCST 
Categories 3.53 (1.98) 0.539 0.09 5.85 <.0001* 0.35 – 0.73 0.410 
Perseveration errors 7.16 (6.78) 0.105 0.02 4.37 <.0001* 0.06 – 0.15 0.230 
Attentional errors 1.72 (2.03) 0.284 0.11 2.69 .012 0.07 – 0.50 0.087 
Verbal fluency 
Semantic fluency 14.34 (7.43) / 
Lexical Fluency 8.59 (6.34) / 
FAB 
Similarities 2.26 (.77) / 
Luria motor sequence 2.32 (.87) -1.702 0.47 -3.60 .001* -2.68 – -0.73 0.169 
Conflicting instructions 2.65 (.84) / 
Go No-Go 2.29 (.97) / 
Digit Spans 
Forward 5.03 (1.09) / 
Backward 3.38 (1.01) / 
Mini-SEA Faux-pas 
Mental attribution 3.92 (2.75) -1.249 0.42 -2.95 .007* -2.12 – -0.38 0.104 
 
Table 1. Results of the Automated Linear Modelling assessing the predictors of 
imitation behaviour with Means (M) and Standard deviations (SD). For the variables 
retained in the model: unstandardized beta coefficient, standardized error, t values, 
significance, 95% confidence interval (lower, upper) and importance.  
*=values passing the significance threshold corrected for Holm-Bonferroni multiple 
comparison. 
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